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Intellectual property currently occupies a prominent place in the
domestic and international economic policy agenda of the United
States. To a lesser extent, this has always been true. After all, Madison
made sure that the concept of protection for inventors and authors
was enshrined in our Constitution. In the subsequent history of our
country, however, the amount of attention given to patents, trade-
marks, copyrights and other forms of intellectual property has never
been as high as it is now.
I. WHY THE CURRENT PUSH ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?
What explains the current prominence of intellectual property is-
sues? The increasing importance of foreign competition and markets
to U.S. firms is one factor. Tremendous growth in overseas markets
and stiffened international competition at home have convinced major
U.S. firms that success in the U.S. market alone is not enough. We
live in a world market. Infringement anywhere can blunt export
opportunities, distrub third country markets and even show up in
our domestic market. The United States is the largest producer of
copyrighted works and the heaviest investor in basic research and
development in the world. Clearly we have an interest in better
protection of intellectual property both at home and abroad.
The cost and incidence of infringement are also rising. The rapid
spread of technology to more and more countries around the world
has shortened the lag time between innovation and copy. New tech-
nologies have not only inspired new infringements but have also made
copying easier and more profitable. Where previous piracy centered
on the unauthorized copying of books, films and musical works, it
now includes the unauthorized copying of computer software and of
semi-conductor chips. Where earlier counterfeiting schemes focused
on copies of brand name consumer goods, we now confront the
counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals, agrichemicals and even spare parts
for aircraft.




The International Trade Commission estimated that in 1986 U.S.
companies may have lost between $43 and $61 billion because of
foreign infringement of intellectual property rights. While the figure
is admittedly imprecise, it leaves no doubt that increasing the pro-
tection afforded to U.S. holders of intellectual property rights both
at home and abroad must be an economic priority of the United
States.
II. WHERE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STANDS
The U.S. government has long been active in encouraging improved
intellectual property protection. The U.S. pressed for new interna-
tional conventions, such as the Brussels Statellite Convention and the
Budapest Treaty for Deposit of Microorganisms, to augment the
major intellectual property conventions (the Paris Convention for
Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne Convention for Lit-
erary and Artistic Works). In the past, the U.S. government also
held bilateral consultations, largely to resolve business problems on
a case-by-case basis.
By the mid-1970s, however, the problem of trade in counterfeit
goods had grown to the point that business groups were demanding
greater action. The United States therefore sought to include an anti-
counterfeiting agreement in the results of the Tokyo Round of the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. The proposal attracted
significant support, particularly in the United States and Europe, but
because of its late introduction and opposition from some developing
countries, it was not included in the final agreement produced by
that Round.
In the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Congress clearly linked trade
and intellectual property. Intellectual property was a "new" trade
issue, along with services and investment. The Trade Act made in-
tellectual property infringement a subject of the National Trade Es-
timates Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, a cause of action under
Section 301, and a consideration in the designation of countries for
inclusion in the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI").
The U.S. government policy since then was most fully enunciated
in an Administration statement of April 7, 1986 which stressed the
goal of improving multilateral conventions and domestic protection.
Importantly, the statement also committed the United States to seek
a GATT agreement on intellectual property, not limited to counter-
feiting, and a vigorous program of bilateral consultations.
1989]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
A. Multilateral Conventions
The United States is working in the World Intellectual Property
Organization to strengthen current conventions and develop new ones.
Negotiations on patent law harmonization and the protection of
biotechnology are ongoing. Next month, we hope to conlcude a treaty
for the registration of audio-visual works. By verifying ownership,
this should assist legal actions against film piracy.
The U.S. will host a diplomatic conference for the protection of
semiconductor chips in Washington in May 1989. In bilateral dis-
cussions, we have encouraged other countries, especially developing
countries, to join multilateral intellectual property conventions. Im-
portantly in this regard, the President and Congress approved United
States entry into the Berne Convention, bringing the United States
into the mainstream of international copyright relations as of March
1, 1989.
B. GA TT Multilateral Trade Negotiations
As part of the Uruguay Round, the United States has proposed a
comprehensive agreement on intellectual property, including stan-
dards, internal and border enforcement, and GATT-type dispute set-
tlement procedures, all instituted with a view to minimizing obstructions
to legitimate trade. More on this later.
C. Domestic Legislation
By eliminating the injury test and expanding the definition of
domestic industry, the Omnibus Trade Act makes it easier for firms
to use Section 337 of the 1974 Trade Act, the provision of U.S. law
that authorizes the International Trade Commission to bar the import
of goods infringing U.S. intellectual property rights. The Trade Act
also revises U.S. patent law to allow process patent holders to prevent
the import of products produced by an infringing process.
D. Bilateral Consulations
The United States has held bilateral discussions with countries in
Asia, Latin America, the Mideast and elsewhere to improve their
intellectual property laws and enforcement. The GSP review process
(the 1984 Trade Act mandated that intellectual property protection
be a consideration in reviewing GSP access to the U.S. market) and
Section 301 cases or threats thereof have called attention to our
intellectual property concerns.
In the last two years, the United States has established bilateral
copyrights relations with Singapore, and is near reaching bilateral
agreements with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Korea has passed
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a modern copyright law and joined the Universal Copyright Con-
vention. Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia have improved their patent
laws to include protection for pharmaceutical products. Indonesia
and Chile have drafted modern patent laws which are now under
consideration for adoption in those countries.
After a lengthy process begun by an industry petition under Section
301 of the Trade Act, the United States retaliated against Brazil in
1988 for its failure to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals.
A similar Section 301 investigation is underway against Argentina.
III. WHY TnE GATT?
The United States raised the intellectual property issue at the GATT
for several reasons. First, current international intellectual property
agreements do not include dispute settlement provisions other than a
provision to take disputes concerning treaty interpretations to the
International Court of Justice. The GATT offers the possibility of
extending effective dispute settlement mechanisms to intellectual prop-
erty issues. Second, some intellectual property standards, particularly
those in the Paris Convention pertaining to patents, allow serious
commerical and trade losses to occur because of the lack of specifics
on levels of protection, fields of protection, and time periods for
protection. Third, the GATT offers a different negotiating dynamic
than does the World Intellectual Property Organization. Unlike the
situation in WIPO, caucuses of developed, developing and other coun-
tries are not the practice in the GATT. Also, the many topics under
discussion at the GATT (there are 15 negotiating groups in the Uruguay
Round) provide potential for trade-offs not just within the area of
intellectual property but also across the many subject areas under
negotiation in the Round. A last consideration is time limititations.
While GATT Rounds do not always end as scheduled, history has
shown that they do end. The Uruguay Round is to be completed by
the end of 1990.
Underlying all of these reasons for seeking a GATT solution is the
U.S. preference for a multilateral rather than a bilateral sulution to
the trade problems caused by lack of adequate intellectual property
protection.
IV. UNITED STATES GoAis IN T= GATT
What the United States seeks is a GATT agreement on patents,
trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and the protection of integrated
circuits that will raise existing intellectual property protection standards
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where necessary, will provide effective enforcement measures at the
border and internally, and will adapt GATT dispute settlement pro-
cedures to the intellectual property area.
Substantive standards are necessary simply because standards in
existing agreements are inadequate to prevent intellectual property laws
from establishing significant trade barriers. For example, the Paris
Convention (patents and trademarks) does not include obligations re-
garding what subject matter must be patentable or the duration of
patents. This leads to many Paris Convention signatories refusing to
grant patent protection to a number of economically important sectors
such as pharmaceutical and chemical products.
Another example of how intellectual property regulations can create
trade barriers is the compulsory licensing requirement for failure to
manufacture ("work" a patent). This can also deprive a patent holder
of the right to trade in his invention. The economic inefficiency of
promoting manufacturing of every product in every country is apparent.
A GATT agreement should develop rules to minimize the negative
trade effects of "working" requirements. While the Berne Convention
provides a high level of copyrights protection standards, full protection
for computer software and sound recordings needs to be clearly es-
tablished. In the area of trade secrets (or proprietary business infor-
mation), there is simply no international agreement.
The second essential element of a GATT agreement is enforcement.
Countries would undertake an obligation to enforce agreed-upon stan-
dards. A copyright has little value if the owner has no way of enforcing
its rights. The best law in the world will have little effect on video
and audio tape pirates, if they know that the police never raid, the
courts never issue injunctions, or that the penalties are easily absorbed
as a cost of doing business. To be effective, standards must be enforced
both in the internal market and at the border. Enforcement systems
must be fair and open. Plaintiffs must be able to obtain the evidence
necessary to enforce rights, whether under civil or criminal procedures.
Remedies should be sufficient to help deter future violations.
Third, basic GATT concepts such as dispute settlement and trans-
parency need to be adapted to the special requirements of intellectual
property protection and should be included in a GATT agreement.
V. PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT
In Punta del Este at the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the
United States had few allies in its efforts to add intellectual property
to the agenda. Japan was the only other true believer. Since then,
overcoming initial hesitancy on the part of some of its membership,
[Vol. 19:2
TRADE CONFERENCE
the European Community has also come to seek a comprehensive
approach to negotiations. The Nordic countries, Australia, New Zea-
land, Canada, Switzerland and others now share this objective.
Developing countries, on the other hand, have been more reserved.
Most have adopted a low-key approach to the negotiations. Some, led
by Brazil and India, have questioned the mandate for any negotiations
beyond those on a counterfeiting agreement.
At the Montreal mid-term review in December 1988, trade ministers
reached agreement on instructions for eleven of the fifteen negotiating
groups for the remainder of the Round. They were unable to agree
on instructions for four groups: agricultrue, intellectual property, tex-
tiles and safeguards. Negotiations in all groups are presently suspended
pending resolution of how to proceed in these four areas. A meeting
of senior trade officials during the week of April 3 will address these
outstanding areas.
Personally, I am optimistic. There are no guarantees that the United
States point of view will prevail on any particular item now under
negotiation, but it seems highly unlikely that world economic leaders
would lightly place the strain of a failed Uruguay Round on the
international trading system. This inherent pressure for a successful
Round should enhance the prospects for a comprehensive intellectual
property agreement. Why is this the case?
In the United States and elsewhere, it is the strongest supporters of
an open international trading system and the GATT who are the
proponents of a comprehensive intellectual property agreement. The
trading system can ill afford to have them as an opponent during the
period of final negotiation and implementation of the Round.
There are economic benefits for developed and developing countries
in providing adequate protection for intellectual property. While some
countries have firms that derive short-term profit from the lack of
protection, the long-term economic benefits to innovation and economic
development that result from protecting intellectual property are sig-
nificant. Local innovation is inspired if it is rewarded. Top-of-the-line
technology is not transferred when it is not going to receive protection.
Pirates do not invest in research and development. Markets for pirated
and counterfeited goods are closing around the world.
Finally, the alternative to a comprehensive multilateral agreement
in the GATT is more unilateral and bilateral pressure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our goal in the GATT on intellectual property is ambitious. We
have gained considerable support. We still need more to be able to
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negotiate the type of agreement we seek. What is equally clear,
however, is that the world trading system can no longer ignore the
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. Intellectual prop-
erty protection is a priority for the United States, even among the
subjects under the discussion at Uruguay Round. Our success in
achieving an effective agreement on intellectual property will be an
important key to the ultimate success of the Uruguay Round.
